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NOTES

DUTY OF A URANIUM MINER TO SUPPORT
THE SURFACE ESTATE
A in 1855 conveyed to B, reserving in himself and his successors in
interest all rights to the mineral fee, including the privilege to mine, sell,
explore, develop or otherwise enjoy any and all metals or minerals found
on the land. A subsequently conveyed the mineral fee to C, and C to F
the present owners in 1955.1
At the time of the original reservation by A many of the modern day
minerals and methods of mining were virtually unknown. Uranium and
the present mining method in vogue in Wyoming can reasonably be
assumed to have been without contemplation by parties to deeds one
hundred years ago; or prior to the time when its true value was known.
Because of this, a problem now confronts the attorney in this state and
others where the open cut method of mining is used, namely: what is the
duty of a uranium miner to support or protect the surface estate? What
are the general rules relating to the support and protection of land? Are
they applicable to the uranium miner? And, how can the owner of the
mineral fee and a surface owner be afforded an opportunity to enjoy their
respective fees without substantial interference from others? The rule has
been that the owner of a surface estate is entitled to the lateral and subJacent support of his land in its natural state. This rule was first asserted
in Harris v. Ryding,2 reaffirmed in Humphries v. Bragden3 and is still
followed in American cases today. 4 Lateral support is that support which
land receives from adjoining land, or any support which may have been
substituted for the natural condition of the land; whereas, subjacent support is that support which land receives from the earth beneath it, or
support which has been substituted for the natural condition.5 These two
types of support have been historically classified as natural or proprietory
rights incident to the ownership of the surface or dominant estate.
Chiefly, the liability of the mineral estate to furnish lateral and subjacent support has been predicated on two theories: (1) When a grantor
severs the mineral fee from the surface, reserving the surface in himself,
there is an "implied reservation" that only so much of the mineral or
minerals may be removed as will leave a sufficient support for the surface
estate.6 (2) The other ground of liability is based on the rationale of the
maxim "sic utero tuo ut alienum non laedus." A liberal interpretation of
this means that a person should only use his property in such manner as
not to injure others.7
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This right of support is sometimes referred to, by text writers, as a
third estate, with the possibility of such right being vested in a third
person other than the owner of the mineral fee or surface owner; and, if
such is the case, the owner of the surface estate may not bring an action
for subsidence against the owner of the mineral fee.s Perhaps it is well
to note that a right of action for subsidence is only acquired when the
subsidence occurs," not at the time of excavation, and likewise the Statute
of Limitations will not begin to run until the actual occurrence of such
subsidence.10
An extreme application of the rule which enforces absolute liability
on the owner of the mineral fee for lateral and subjacent support is illustrated by Nooran v. Pardee." Here, the court stated that the surface
owner has the right to demand sufficient support, even, if to the end that it
be necessary to leave every ton of coal untouched under his land. Continuing, the court stated the caveat that all the owner of the mineral
receives, in the absence of a clear waiver of the right to support, is whatever he can obtain without injury to the surface in its natural state. On
a similar rationale, it has been held that a reservation of all minerals with
sufficient privilege to mine the same did not give the grantor the right to
destroy the surface,' 2 and, a mineral owner is liable for strip mining where
the surface is damaged, even though an 1855 deed did grant the full,
entire, and complete right to the minerals.'
The foregoing reasoning has
been the dominant tone of the cases in this area, however, jurisdictions
4
which have taken issue to this approach have done so vigorously.'
The earliest denunciation of the holding in Hum phries v. Bragden"
was asserted in Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Company.16

The ratio deciendi

of the latter case was that a mineral owner engaged in tunnel mining
operations, owned all that he had purchased and could develop the same
without limitations from his grantors as to support, and there is no implied
reservation as to a duty to support the surface owner.
Since the earlier minerals were conducive chiefly to tunnel or subterranean methods of mining, the law as to lateral and subjacent support,
as well as other protection to be afforded the surface owner, t 7 was applied
in that context. Jurisdictions refused to relax the strict application of
the Bragden rule' s even though the mineral involved was of more value
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than the surface"' or that the mineral was withdrawn according to the
customary manner.20 The earliest indication that the doctrine of subjacent and lateral support may not be applicable to the open cut method
of mining, which is the prevalent manner of mining uranium in Wyoming
today, was indicated in the decision of Hendricks v. Spring Valley Min.
and Irr. Company.2'1 The California court decided the doctrine of lateral
support did not apply to adjoining owners of placer mining claims, for to
apply such doctrine would defeat the purpose for which the claims were
located. Technically, placer differs from that of the open cut method of
mining, however, such difference is not so fundamental as to necessitate a
change in the rule of law applied here, when transferred to an open cut or
strip mining community. Thus, if this decision were to be followed by
the Wyoming courts, the uranium miner in this state would owe no duty
22
of lateral support to adjoining claim owner.
Jurisdictions have been relatively silent as to the inapplicability of the
doctrine of subjacent support to strip, open pit, and open cut methods of
mining. Cases with facts adaptable to such a discussion have been before
the courts frequently, but the grounds for the holdings in such cases were
based on intent of parties at time of reservation,2- 1 negligence,2 4 the balance
26
of the equities,2- , and statutory liability.
A decision directly on the point was rendered in English v. Harris
Clay Company.27 Here the owner of the surface rights attempted to
recover damages from the owner of the mineral rights, sustained when the
latter removed surface soil in mining for Kaolin. The court held that
the custom of open pit mining, or mining by the removal of the top soil,
for the recovery of Kaolin and similar minerals was in vogue in that
locality; hence, the doctrine of subjacent support, since it pertained speci19.
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United States v. Polina, 131 F.Supp. 772 (N.D. WN.Va. 1955). Held: The owner of
a reserved mineral interest could not strip mine for coal resulting in the destruction
of surface estate deeded to the United States for forestry purposes, even though
that was the customary method in that area because the parties could not have
intended the owner of surface rights to be deprived thereof.
Colorado Fuel and Iron Corp. v. Salardina, 125 Colo. 516, 245 P.2d 461, 32 A.L.K.2d
1302 (1952).
Held: It is incumbent upon the surface owner to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the owner of the subjacent rights operated in a
reckless, careless, or negligent manner to surface owner's damage before recovery
can be obtained for structures erected on the surface.
Held: The only practical
Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo. 1262, 215 Pac. 534 (1923).
method of mining the mineral was by strip and the surface was practically worthless, therefore an injunction was refused on the contingency that the mineral owner
Here the Defendant's loss
would compensate the surface owner for damages.
would be incomparably greater than Plaintiff's damage.
Whiles v. Grand Junction Mining and Fuel Company, 86 Colo. 1418, 282 Pac. 260
(1929).
Held: The mineral owner was enjoined from mining until a sufficient
indemnity bond be given by him under the statute. (Colo. Comp. Laws 1921, § 3299)
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 92-24-6 (1953).
English v. Harris Clay Co., 225 N.C. 467, 35 S.E.2d 339 (1945).
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fically to subterranean mining, was of doubtful application. It was also
asserted that the defendant's duty was to use due care in recovering the
mineral so as not to injure the surface any more than necessary. Supposedly for a surface owner to recover on the basis of such holding, it
would be inctmbent upon him to prove that the subjacent owner injured
the.surface more than necessary.
English Clay Company28 modifies Humphries v. Bragden29 and
presents a new theory in this area of the law. From the indications in
Banks v. Tennessee Mineral Corporation,"3 and Alabama Vermiculite
Corporation v. Patterson," ' a relaxation of the doctrine of absolute liability,
which has been imposed on the mineral estate for support of the surface
estate regardless of the custom or the most approved methods of extracting
such ore, could very well have commenced.
An adoption of the new theory in this and other jurisdictions would
not per se prohibit the application of all equitable approaches, which to a
degree are necessary if both surface and mineral owners are to be ade32
quately protected. If, under the Harris Clay Company rule, it is necessary for the mineral owner to destroy all the surface in the mining process,
then the surface owner is to be compensated by the applicable rule of
damages.A3
When such danger appears imminent, it appears that Section
57-905 of the XVyoming Compiled Statutes (1945), would apply. This
statute gives the surface owner the right to demand satisfactory security
from the miner and if the same is refused, the surface owner may enjoin
the mining activity until the security is furnished. The Wyoming Court
has never had an occasion to interpret this statute; however, it appears
that when enacted complete destruction of the surface estate was not the
interest of the legislature. A similar statute34 has been construed by the
Colorado court so as to allow the court to enjoin all further mining until
a bond that will cover all damage to the surface rights caused by such
mining is furnished by the mineral owner. If the intent of the legislature,
which is to furnish protection for the surface owner against mining
activities, is followed, such an interpretation would seem applicable in a
jurisdiction where the total surface destruction is threatened.
A problem similar to the above mentioned arose in United States v.
Polino.3 5 Here the court did not mention the Harris Clay Company rule
and based its holding on the intention of the parties. In this case the
mineral owner strip mined coal which resulted in destruction of the surface
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estate. The court held that the mineral owner knew when the surface
was deeded to the United States for forestry purposes that the land would
be of little or no use if the surface was destroyed, therefore the mineral
owner did not acquire with the reservation the right to use the strip
method of mining.
The Wyoming court has three prevailing rules from which to choose
in resolving cases involving the duty of a uranium miner to furnish surface
support: (1) The miner has an absolute liability to support the surface
estate.:" (2) Surface support depends on the intention of the parties at
the time of the grant.3T'
(3) The rule imposing absolute liability is inapplicable to strip and open cut mining.3 s The adoption of rule (1) or (2)
would inflict a fatal blow to the progress of the uranium industry because
the chief method of uranium mining in this area is the open cut by which
it is necessary to destroy a certain portion of the surface estate. To apply
the third rule would extend to the mineral owner the opportunity to make
maximum use of his estate, once the surface owner is fully compensated
for his loss. In this manner both parties are given full enjoyment of their
property as far as practical, avoiding the possibility of one estate usurping
the other.
This aggregate of decisions3'0' is of prime significance to the uranium
miner in Wyoming, for they afford him a forecast of what his duties are
as to the surface estate if he is to avoid liability.

Under these decisions

the uranium miner's privileges and prohibitions are:

(1) he must refrain

from performing his operations in a reckless or wanton manner. 40 (2)

the

miner owes no duty to adjoining claim holders for lateral support, 41 (3)
there is no liability for subsidence as to structures on the surface unless
-2
(4) the uranium miner owes an absolute duty not to

he is negligent,

injure the surface more than necessary,

(5) if a miner should happen to

be negligent, his damages would be based upon the reduction in value of
the land for its surface use, 43 including loss of profits to the surface owner.
If demanded, the mineral owner must furnish a satisfactory security to the
surface owner.
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